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Abstract 
Society’s perception of the legitimacy of the accounting profession and its members is 
grounded in the verbal and visual images of accountants that are projected not only by 
accountants themselves but also by the media.  The paper uses the critical literature on 
stereotypes to examine how books written for a general readership on Enron and other 
corporate failures portray accountants and accounting, and the implications their authors draw 
for corporate governance and the survival of the financial system.  The paper explores how 
commentators have analysed the changing activities of accountants (including the rise of 
consulting) and have contrasted the personalities of “founding fathers” of the US accounting 
profession with their early 21st-century successors.  The paper concludes that changing 
stereotypes of accountants may be evidence of “negative signals of movement” for the 
accounting profession, threatening accounting’s ongoing professionalization project. 
 
Key words: Accounting profession, Enron, stereotypes, professionalization, auditing, 
popular management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An understanding of the external images of accounting1 and accountants is important to an 
appreciation of the roles of accounting in a broader social context.  The accounting profession 
considers it necessary to project an image of confidence and respectability and to offer 
challenges, rewards and prospects in order to attract and retain the most talented members 
(for example, Buffini & Cornell, 2005; Kazi, 2006). Similarly, maintaining and enhancing 
jurisdiction over work, including the often hard-won privileges of the accounting profession, 
depends upon perceptions within the broader community of the education, expertise and 
ethics of professional accountants.  Upholding the public’s trust is essential not only for 
preserving respectability but also for ensuring the survival of accounting’s status as a 
profession.  Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that professional accounting associations 
strive to project a positive image of accounting and accountants in order to attract the best 
members, to extend jurisdiction over work, and to sustain and enhance the faith of the public 
in the profession.  Much has been written about popular perceptions of lawyers and the legal 
profession (for example, Abel, 1997).  However, relatively little scholarly attention has been 
paid to the issue for accountants.  
 
The unexpected collapse of Enron and the bewildering demise of Arthur Andersen2 in the 
aftermath sent shock waves through the accounting profession worldwide.  The impact of 
Enron’s collapse was greater because it was closely followed by the bankruptcy of 
WorldCom in the USA, while scandals and collapses involving companies such as HIH in 
Australia, Parmalat in Italy, Royal Ahold in the Netherlands and Equitable Life Assurance 
Society in the UK showed that this was not just a US phenomenon. “Enronitis” became a 
label associated with highly questionable accounting and auditing practices.  Although these 
practices were widely condemned as they became public knowledge, they sharply 
undermined confidence in corporate financial reporting and auditing as well as corporate 
regulation.  Professional accountants are currently striving to absorb and effectively deal with 
an ever-growing mix of new rules on corporate governance, audit independence and financial 
reporting, among other prescriptions.  For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the 
USA enacted many reforms aimed at achieving improved corporate responsibility, enhanced 
financial disclosure, greater auditor independence and increased oversight of the accounting 
profession through the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  Such 
“medicine” is necessarily being taken by a profession which, according to Brewster (2003, 
p. 4) “has forfeited what was nearly unconditional respect from the public”.3  Meanwhile, 
 
1 In some parts of the English-speaking world, the word “accountancy” is commonly used to refer to the work 
activity of accountants.  However, in the USA, the term “accounting profession” is more likely to be used, and 
as most of the evidence on which this paper is based is taken from US sources, we have used the term 
“accounting” instead of “accountancy”.  
2 The firm originally known as “Arthur Andersen & Co.” gradually dropped parts of this name, becoming 
“Arthur Andersen” in the mid-1990s and simply “Andersen” in 2001 (“Arthur Andersen re-brands . . . again”, 
Accounting, April 2001, p. 15). 
3 Brewster forgets the many times in the past when the accounting and auditing profession has come under 
heavy public criticism, for example in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash and in the late 1960s. 
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professional accounting associations are endeavouring to send positive messages about the 
post-Enron state of the profession (for example, Parker, 2005a) while the PCAOB in the USA 
is working to restore investors’ faith in audited financial reports (for example, Parker, 2005b). 
Despite the considerable interest in the Enron scandal and its consequences within the critical 
accounting literature, (see, for instance, the special issue of Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting entitled “Enron.Con” – O’Connell, 2004) little attention has been given in the 
post-Enron period to studying the image of accountants.  This is despite opinion poll 
evidence from the USA that the public perception of the prestige of accountants, already low 
before Enron, had fallen in the aftermath of the scandals of 2001 and 2002 (Belski & Pope, 
2006), implying that “the greatest challenge for accounting is still its image” (Buffini & 
Cornell, 2005, p. 13). 
In this paper, we have two objectives.  The first is to examine how the existing stereotypes of 
the accountant were used by commentators (usually with a business background but not 
necessarily with accounting training) in the literature that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Enron collapse.  To what extent do writers use the stereotypes explicitly?  Even if there is 
little explicit use, do the stereotypes help us to make sense of the implicit messages being 
communicated by writers?  The second objective is to examine how the existence and use of 
accountant stereotypes affects the legitimacy of the accounting profession.  In particular, does 
what we call the business professional stereotype, which professional accounting bodies and 
firms apparently wish to institutionalize, actually subvert the legitimacy of the accounting 
profession in the eyes of society? 
 
To answer these questions, we make use of a type of material hitherto little used in the critical 
accounting literature: popular books written for a general readership.  We draw upon the 
large collection of books published during the period 2002 to 2006 on the Enron collapse, 
supplemented by a review of the smaller number of books considering other scandals, such as 
WorldCom and HIH.  In addition, book-length studies of the fall of Arthur Andersen were 
examined, as well as authoritative contributions on corporate governance that appeared 
during this period.  As well as reviewing what the commentators have written on the identity 
of accountants and the image of accounting in the immediate post-Enron period, this study 
also considers where authors’ ideas are likely to have come from and the types of material 
that they appealed to in making their observations.  The paper is structured as follows.  The 
next section outlines the study’s theoretical perspectives, and reviews prior studies of the 
“accountant stereotype”.  There follows a more detailed examination of the sources used and 
the evidence drawn from the sources, which, in turn, is followed by a discussion and analysis 
of the evidence.  Conclusions are stated in the final section. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Legitimacy theory 
Consistent with the notion that organizations are part of a broader social system, the 
perspectives provided by legitimacy theory indicate that organizations do not possess an 
inherent right to own or use resources or even to exist.  Society confers legitimacy upon an 
organization, where legitimacy is defined as “a condition or status which exists when an 
entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which 
the entity is a part” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 2; also see Deegan, 2002, p. 292).  Legitimacy theory 
itself relies upon the concept of a “social contract” (this version of legitimacy theory is also 
known as social contract theory), which is used to define the arrangement, explicit or 
implicit, between an organization and members of society (Deegan, 2002, p. 292; Mathews, 
1993, p. 26).  Under legitimacy theory, as stated by Deegan (2002, p. 293), “it is considered 
that an organization’s survival will be threatened if society perceives that the organization has 
breached its social contract”.  Organizational legitimacy is, therefore, a resource on which an 
organization depends for its existence (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).   
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Under social contract theory, the cornerstone of morality is uniform social accords that serve 
the best interests of those entering into agreements.  These agreements, of course, do not need 
to be written legal documents.  Rather, social contracts are shared understandings of 
appropriate behaviour that guide social actors towards behaving in ways that are broadly 
recognized as moral.  Contemporary versions of social contract theory are concerned with 
showing how individual and social group rights and liberties are founded on mutually 
advantageous agreements between members of society (Rawls, 1999).   According to Shocker 
& Sethi (1974), a social contract is conceived to exist between the organization and the public 
at large, not just its owners (shareholders of a company, for example, or partners of a 
professional firm, such as a large international accounting firm).  Legitimacy theory suggests 
that, where there is a severe breach of a social contract by an organization (that is, where 
there is a serious failure to comply with societal expectations) “the community may ‘revoke’ 
its contract to continue operations” (Deegan & Rankin, 1996, p. 54).  In such circumstances, 
the costs of the organization continuing to operate can be perceived to be greater than its 
benefits to society as an ongoing entity.  If this is the case, the social contract with that 
organization may be terminated.  On the other hand, organizations that are perceived to be 
honouring social contracts are regarded as providing benefits to society in excess of costs and 
remain constantly poised to continue to enhance their performance.  In this paper, it is 
suggested that Arthur Andersen’s failure to meet societal expectations in the Enron case was 
perceived as so severe that the firm’s social contract was revoked.  
 
Accounting’s professional project 
Organizations severely breaching social contracts may not only have their social contracts 
terminated but may also contribute to damaging the reputations of other organizations of a 
similar type.  Hence the collapse of Arthur Andersen could be perceived as a threat to the 
survival not only of the remaining “Big Four” accounting firms but also of professional 
accounting bodies in general.  As this study focuses on accounting and accountants, it 
concerns the ongoing professional project of accounting: the attempts of accountants both as 
individuals and operating through institutional structures such as firms and associations to 
establish and then maintain accounting’s status as a profession rather than a trade, craft or 
industry.  The study, therefore, also draws upon the notion of social closure encapsulated in 
the sociology of the professions literature.  Under this perspective, Larson (1977, p. xvii) 
graphically locates the professional project as “an attempt to translate one order of scarce 
resources – special knowledge and skills – into another – social and economic rewards”.   
Carnegie & Edwards (2001, p. 301) have portrayed professionalization as a dynamic process 
involving a diversity of “signals of movement” towards occupational ascendancy that arise in 
periods before and after the formation of occupational associations (see also Lee, 2006).   We 
claim that this dynamic, on-going process may also involve a range of “negative signals of 
movement” which, if particularly strong and sufficiently high profile, may hinder or even 
divert the professionalization trajectory of accountants not just within a single country but 
internationally.  In this study, the evidence to be presented of post-Enron perceptions of 
accounting and accountants is further informed by theory relating to the dynamics of 
occupational groups, especially perspectives in accounting’s professionalization literature 
that broadly place an emphasis on process rather than on outcomes (see Carnegie & Edwards, 
2001, p. 303; Chua & Poullaos, 1998, p. 157).  Accordingly, the findings of this study of the 
literature of Enron are interpreted using a combination of legitimacy theory and perspectives 
on the dynamics of occupational groups.4 
 
4 Other theories that have been used to help achieve an understanding of the Enron/Andersen debacle include 
agency theory (Arnold & de Lange, 2004), financialization (Froud, Johal, Papazian, & Williams, 2004), and 
Giddens’ theories of late modernity (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). 
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Stereotype theory 
The word “stereotype” originated in the context of printing, and the first prominent use of the 
word in a social science context was in the 1920s.  The US journalist Walter Lippmann, in his 
book Public opinion (Lippmann, 1922), used the term to describe the simplifying “pictures” 
that we are alleged to form about the people and events that we encounter in society.  Hinton 
(2000, pp. 7-8) suggests that stereotyping involves three elements.  First, a group of people 
will be distinguished from the mass by reference to a given identifying characteristic.  
Common identifying characteristics for stereotypes are nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, 
occupation and appearance – thus the group of accountants could be distinguished from 
everyone who is not an accountant.  Second, other (stereotypical) characteristics are 
associated with members of the identified group.  For example, accountants may be thought 
of as boring.  Finally, whenever we identify someone as belonging to a given group, we also 
attribute the stereotypical characteristic or characteristics to that person.  So, if we identify 
someone as an accountant, we assume that he or she is boring.  Hence, a stereotype is 
constructed from the set of characteristics that we automatically associate with members of 
an identifiable social group. 
 
The early literature of stereotyping theory regarded stereotypes as essentially false and 
potentially dangerous, and stereotypes were seen as linked with prejudice – “most writers 
agree that stereotypes are undesirable and should be eradicated” (Brigham, 1971, p. 30).  
More recent exploration of stereotypes, particularly within social psychology, has tended to 
regard stereotypes more neutrally.  Two useful aspects of the stereotype have been identified: 
the “prototype” (Mervis & Rosch, 1981) and the “schema” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  The 
“prototype” of a particular class of objects or persons is the “model” of that object or person 
that comes to mind as best representing the object or person.  Everyone’s prototype is likely 
to be different: one person’s prototype accountant, for example, may be an actual accountant, 
while another’s may be a fictional accountant, a character in a movie or television 
programme.  A “schema” is how we organize our knowledge and beliefs about a particular 
concept (such as a type of object or person).  We may form schemas about occupational roles, 
such as that of an accountant.   The schema will include characteristics that we attribute to 
accountants, such as dullness, and also expectations as to how they will act in given 
circumstances, for example, by keeping a tight control over expenditure.  Schemas take for 
granted a certain degree of predictability: we expect members of particular groups to react in 
certain ways, and may be puzzled when they do not react as predicted.  As Hinton (2000, 
p. 95) notes, “Stereotypes provide us with an interpretive framework by which we can 
explain the behaviour of others”. 
 
An important question raised by stereotype theory is how far stereotypes are rigid or open to 
change.  If they can be changed, what processes are likely to be effective?  There is 
substantial evidence that stereotypes are difficult to change, and it has been suggested 
(Johnston, 1996) that an important factor in this is the tendency of those holding stereotypes 
to give greater weight to cases that confirm the stereotype than to cases that appear to 
challenge the stereotype.  This process can sometimes take the form of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), where action taken on the basis of a 
stereotypical view of an individual or group leads to consequences that reinforce the 
stereotype.  For example, those recruiting potential accountants for professional firms may 
have a stereotypical view of accountants as “good at numbers, bad at words”, and 
consequentially may favour applicants offering such attributes.  This will tend to reinforce the 
stereotype.  Even where high-profile individuals in a particular group seem to challenge the 
stereotype, they may be bracketed off as a “subtype” rather than leading to a revision of the 
stereotype (Kunda & Oleson, 1995).  For example, if the standard stereotype of accountants 
is that they are uncreative, the existence of some “creative” accountants may not lead to a 
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general revision of the stereotype, rather these individuals will either be located in a subtype, 
leaving the existing accountant stereotype unchanged, or perhaps will not be considered “real 
accountants” at all. 
 
Stereotypes are not just a matter of how individuals perceive “others”, but also about how 
individuals locate themselves, or are located by others, as members of particular groups. 
It is the groups to which we belong that establish our social identity: who we are in our 
society, such as woman, Asian, grandmother, accountant, golf club member, gay, Ford driver, 
etc.  Further, group membership is associated with self-esteem, in that if we belong to a 
favoured group then it will reflect positively on our social identity.  (Hinton, 2000, p. 113, 
emphasis in original) 
 
Tajfel & Turner (1986) developed Social Identity Theory as a way of explaining how we 
categorize ourselves as members of various social groups.  But different groups have 
different status in society.  “The position of some groups in society may be seen as legitimate 
in that their status is accepted by other groups, such as the status of doctors” (Hinton, 2000, p. 
115, emphasis in original).  Stereotypes are important in Social Identity Theory because they 
sum up the attitude of society to different groups.  Individuals will prefer to be members of 
groups with positive stereotypes rather than those with negative stereotypes, and legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public will normally be regarded as an attribute contributing to a positive 
stereotype.  Where members of a group believe that their group is being stereotyped 
negatively, they have three options: they can ignore the negative stereotype, leave the group, 
or work to change the stereotype.  The option of leaving the group may be virtually 
impossible (for example, ethnic and gender groupings) or considered to be undesirable (for 
example, occupational groupings where a considerable amount of effort has been invested in 
becoming a member).  Ignoring the negative stereotype, or even accepting and playing up to 
it, may be acceptable if significant costs do not flow from this.  But members of a group 
burdened with a negative stereotype are more likely, if they wish to enhance their social 
status, to work to change the stereotype.  We are able to observe this in relation to 
accountants. 
 
The accountant stereotype 
Professional concern regarding the negative stereotype of the accountant has been expressed 
for at least 40 years.  DeCoster & Rhode (1971, p. 651) observe: 
‘The popular stereotype of a Certified Public Accountant is often in conflict with the 
image desired and held by the accounting profession.  The typical stereotype depicts 
accountants as cold, aloof, and impersonal.  In contrast, CPAs consider themselves 
skilled in the inter-personal abilities necessary to maintain successful client 
relationships.’ 
The study by DeCoster & Rhode (1971) stimulated a literature focusing on the extent to 
which accountants actually exhibited the personal characteristics implied by the perceived 
negative stereotype (for example, Bedeian, Mossholder, Touliatos, & Barkman, 1986; 
Granleese & Barrett, 1990).  More recently, this literature has investigated the extent to 
which attitudes to the accounting profession and the stereotype of the accountant are formed 
at university (for example, Marriott & Marriott, 2003; McDowall & Jackling, 2008).  We do 
not explore in detail the questions of how attitudes to accounting are formed and how 
accurate various stereotypical views of accountants are as descriptions of actual members of 
the profession.  In this paper, we concentrate on how stereotypes of accountants and 
accounting are used, explicitly or implicitly, in more general contexts. 
 
In recent years, increased scholarly attention has been given to examining the popular 
perceptions of the accountant and of accounting.  Studies have examined representations (in 
both words and pictures) of accountants in the movies (Beard, 1994; Holt, 1994; Kyriacou, 
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2000; Dimnik & Felton, 2006; Felton, Dimnick & Bay, 2008), the media (for example, Smith 
& Briggs, 1999; Friedman & Lyne, 2001), art (Yamey, 1989), humour and satire (Bougen, 
1994; Chandler, 1999), novels (West, 2001), the business press (Ewing, Pitts, & Murgolo-
Poole, 2001), job advertisements (Hoffjan, 2004) and “Big Four” recruitment literature 
(Jeacle, 2008) while writers such as Gallhofer & Haslam (1991), Cory (1992), Maltby (1997) 
and Parker (2000) have investigated popular perceptions of accounting and its place in 
society.  Two major accounting stereotypes emerge from this literature.  We refer to the first 
of these as the traditional accountant, although it is often also called the beancounter 
stereotype (see in particular Friedman & Lyne, 2001).  The second stereotype is a more 
recent one, in part a construction of professional accounting bodies and large accounting 
firms.  In tribute to a term introduced by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (1987), we refer to this second stereotype as the business professional, although it 
could also be thought of, in the term used by Jeacle (2008), as the colourful accountant. 
 
As Friedman & Lyne (2001) point out, in practice the stereotypes of accountants are nuanced 
rather than simplistic, and different elements contribute to the definition of the stereotypes.  
The stereotype of the traditional accountant, typically seen as male, has both positive and 
negative characteristics, collectively constituting a schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
Positively, the traditional accountant is honest and trustworthy, careful with money, 
painstaking, reliable, polite and well-spoken.  Negatively, the traditional accountant is dull, 
boring and colourless, excessively fixated with money, pedantic, uncommercial and shabby.  
The term “beancounter” is an “unappealing persona” which “haunts the accounting 
profession” (Jeacle, 2008, p. 1296) as the “shadow of the stereotype still lingers drearily over 
the public conscious” (Jeacle, 2008, p. 1297).  The Chambers Dictionary (2003, p. 128) 
defines a beancounter as “an accountant, esp. one considered parsimonious or unsupportive 
of creativity”.  This traditional stereotype casts the accountant as “single-mindedly 
preoccupied with precision and form, methodical and conservative, and a boring joyless 
character” (Friedman & Lyne, 2001, p. 423).  Dimnik & Felton (2006, p. 129) acknowledge 
how accountants have agonized for many years over their “dull, unappealing image” and note 
the efforts of professional accounting associations and international accounting firms to shed 
this image by improving “the attractiveness of the profession”.  Dictionary definitions of the 
“beancounter” originated in the United States in the mid 1970s (Friedman & Lyne, 2001, p. 
433) and followed the now legendary Monty Python5 sketches of the late 1960s, which 
mercilessly ridiculed accountants (Freidman & Lyne, 2001, p. 433; Jeacle, 2008, p. 1297).  
The beancounter stereotype was seen by the Australian government, in a report entitled 
Beyond bean counting (APSC, 1997), as something that needed to be transcended in order to 
achieve better public management (see also Bisman, 2005). 
Parker (1999), in a presentation entitled “From brown cardi to gold Gucci: Progressing the 
profession’s image in the new millennium”, makes use of metonymy to contrast the 
traditional accountant’s stereotypical shabbiness with the business professional’s slick dress 
sense.  Another metonym for the traditional accountant is the “green eyeshade”, a translucent 
piece of coloured celluloid attached to a piece of string and traditionally worn by clerks and 
other people working with paper to shade the eyes from harsh overhead lights.  The green 
 
5  Bougen (1994, p. 320), in his review of humour and the accountant stereotype, quotes from the famous UK 
television comedy show Monty Python’s Flying Circus broadcast by the BBC on 21 December 1969: “Our 
experts describe you as an appallingly dull fellow, unimaginative, timid, lacking in initiative, spineless, easily 
dominated, no sense of humour, tedious company, irrepressibly drab and awful.  And whereas in most 
professions these would be considerable drawbacks, in chartered accounting they are a positive boon.”  (The full 
text of the “Vocational Guidance Counsellor” sketch from Episode 10 of Monty Python’s Flying Circus is 
available on-line at several locations, including http://orangecow.org/pythonet/sketches/vocation.htm).  In 
Episode 2, first broadcast on 12 October 1969, the actor Graham Chapman portrays a down-market accountant, 
in brown suit and trilby, saying “I’m a chartered accountant, and consequently too boring to be of interest” 
(http://www.orangecow.org/pythonet/sketches/mouse.htm).  
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eyeshade image is probably more potent in the USA than in the UK, and it tends to 
characterize the accountant as a clerical office worker (effectively a bookkeeper).6  In the 
second presidential debate with John Kerry (8 October 2004), President George W. Bush 
used the expression “battling green eyeshades” to refer to the controversy over different 
calculations of the annual amount of tax being avoided by the US rich, implying that the 
numbers did not really matter (Watson, 2006).  In the UK, the green eyeshade image is less 
significant, perhaps because the concept of the “chartered accountant” as a professional 
figure is more embedded.  In their various portrayals of chartered accountants, the Monty 
Python team of comedians often dressed their characters in dark three-piece suits, stiff-
collared white shirts and bowler hats, the “uniform” even as late as the 1960s of bankers in 
the City of London and senior civil servants in Whitehall.  The British traditional stereotype 
of the accountant places him (and again the stereotype is male) in a higher social category 
than the American clerk with the green eyeshade. 
 
As Ewing et al. (2001, pp. 26-27) point out: “If a profession has developed a stereotypical 
image in its publics’ minds, it is vital to determine if the stereotype is a benefit or a detriment 
to that profession.  When it becomes apparent that the accepted stereotype is inhibiting the 
profession’s ability to accurately represent its members and attract new recruits, it is then 
necessary to counter the stereotype.”  Professional accounting associations and major 
international accounting firms have endeavoured since the late 1960s to shake off the 
traditional accountant stereotype, so as to “recruit the best and brightest of students” (Smith 
& Briggs, 1999, p. 28) and to overcome the shortages of students seeking to graduate in 
accounting and enter the profession (ICAEW, 1987; “The Big Eight”, 1989; Anderson-
Gough, Grey, & Robson, 1998; Albrecht & Sack, 2000; Dimnik & Felton, 2006, pp. 129-
130).  The image of the professional accountant “as a high flyer, a ‘jet-setting’ advisor” 
(Anderson-Gough et al., 1998, p. 56) was claimed to reflect the modern day careers at least of 
trainees in the profession.  The recruitment brochures of leading accounting firms generally 
portrayed a career in accounting as dynamic and exciting; “they were high quality, glossy and 
colourful” (Anderson-Gough et al., 1998, p. 56).  Posters of these firms depicted the same 
characteristics.  These images were clearly intended to modify the traditional schema of the 
professional accountant.   
 
Increasingly via text and image, professional accounting was portrayed as “anything other 
than auditing”, as audit work and the related responsibility for protecting the public interest 
conjured the notion of accounting as dull, colourless and boring.  The public interest role of 
the profession was marginalized in modern depictions of professional accountants and their 
work.  The business professional stereotype was used to counter the unfavourable impacts of 
the traditional accountant stereotype.  According to Hopwood (1994, p. 229), “the previous 
boring and rather lowly clerk is now graced with characteristics of the executive, the manager 
and even the entrepreneur … a thrusting, proactive and much more creative being”.  The 
cliché became: “Accounting is the language of business” (Jeacle, 2008, p. 1316).  To the 
education, expertise and ethics associated with professional accounting were added 
characteristics of entrepreneurship. 
 
The notion of professional accountants as creative entrepreneurs may have been regarded as 
comical or even farcical by some and yet as faithful representation or even meritorious by 
others.  For accountants, creativity came to be associated with the risk of deception 
(Friedman & Lyne, 2001, p. 428).  Bougen (1994), for instance, in commenting on the 
 
6 In the 2005 musical version of the movie The Producers (directed by Susan Stroman), the accountant character 
Leo Bloom (played by Matthew Broderick) is shown in a large accounting office with rows of accountants 
sitting at desks with ledgers and adding machines.  As Bloom sits down at his desk, he puts on a green eyeshade, 
thus matching all the other accountants in the office. 
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business professional stereotype, refers to the emergence of a rather unsavoury accounting 
character, associated with earnings manipulation, off-balance-sheet financing manoeuvres 
and even corruption.  This corresponds with the “Villain” stereotype7 of the accountant as 
“calculating, greedy, callous” (Dimnik & Felton, 2006, p. 152).  Professional accountants 
with only a secondary consideration for protecting the public interest are more likely than not 
to adopt a stance of pleasing their client, with favourable implications for personal 
advancement, sometimes at any cost.  Bougen (1994) was writing, of course, before the 
Enron collapse and the associated demise of Arthur Andersen.  Such calamities only serve to 
further cement the impression that the modern business professional stereotype carries its 
own stigma of dishonesty and lack of respectability (Jeacle, 2008, p. 1318).   
 
While the traditional accountant stereotype is primarily negative, it has at least one 
redeeming feature.  The beancounter is associated with honesty and respectability; a lack of 
trustworthiness is not a character pitfall of the traditional accountant stereotype (Friedman & 
Lyne, 2001, p. 425; Jeacle, 2008, p. 1318).  According to Jeacle (2008, p. 1318), “the stigma 
of the boring bookkeeper pales into insignificance when compared with the stigma of a 
greedy and exploitative professional”. On the other hand, the business professional stereotype 
“possesses no such time honoured qualities” (Jeacle, 2008, p. 1318).  Enron and the other 
financial scandals in which professional accountants were implicated exposed the fragility of 
the accounting profession’s attempts to project business professional stereotype as a positive 
image. 
 
THE POST-ENRON LITERATURE 
In order to identify the wide range of books inspired by the collapse of Enron in 2001, other 
corporate scandals around that time, and the fall of Arthur Andersen, extensive searches were 
conducted on the websites of leading on-line booksellers (Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk, 
BarnesandNoble.com, Blackwell.co.uk).  One of the authors used the opportunity provided 
by a visit to Houston, the headquarters of Enron, to identify and obtain a number of other 
books.  The website Amazon.com provides links from individual books to other titles that 
have been purchased by a significant proportion of those buying the given books, and these 
links led to the identification of a small number of further titles.  In order to provide a 
boundary to the research, books published after March 2006 were not included in the 
analysis. 
 
The various searches identified a number of books of different types.  The books identified 
have been classified into four groups: 
I. Insider accounts: books written by (or with the active collaboration of) an 
individual or individuals actively involved in the events being described (mainly the collapse 
of Enron and the fall of Arthur Andersen). 
II. Journalistic accounts: books written usually by financial journalists and based 
largely on press articles, augmented on occasion by interviews and public documents such as 
court proceedings and evidence.  These draw on insider knowledge (usually obtained through 
interviews) at one remove. 
III. Scholarly reflections: books written usually by academics (or having an 
academic style of exposition and presentation, with mobilization of conceptual arguments), 
often based on secondary sources but providing clear documentation of materials used.  
These books frequently reference insider and journalistic accounts. 
IV. “Opportunists”: books referring in passing to Enron or other scandals but 
focusing mainly on unrelated or only partly related topics. 
 
7 Dimnick & Felton (2006) identify, in addition to the “Villain”, four other stereotypes: the accountant as 
“Dreamer”, “Plodder”, “Eccentric” and “Hero”. 
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Figure 1. 
 a particular company while it 
ave the appearance of success, and who tended to make use of their press cuttings as the 
principal source of their material, examinations.  One of these (the 
udy by McLean & Elkind, 2003) has formed the basis of a filmed documentary Enron: The 
book to expound his economic ideas.  Schilit (2002) provides a new edition 
f a book on creative accounting first published in 1991, covering the issues of Enron briefly 
accounting policies with Andersen and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  These 
passages were not analysed further, as the focus of the research is on the image of accounting 
and accountants rather than on substantive accounting choices or changing accounting 
 
 
The relationship between these groups is illustrated in Fig
 
[insert Figures 
 
Figure 1 about here] 
 
The books examined in this study are listed by category in Tables 
 
Table 1.  There have been relatively few insider studies, but several journalistic accounts.  
These vary from short pieces by journalists who had followed
g
 to substantial and detailed 
st
Smartest Guys in the Room,8 while another (Eichenwald, 2005), described on the dust-jacket 
as “a rip-roaring narrative of epic proportions”, extends over nearly 750 pages. 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The books classified as “opportunists” use the name of Enron in their titles or in marketing 
materials, but this is a chance for the authors to exploit the publicity surrounding Enron to 
increase the likely interest in their books.  For example, Barreveld (2002) reproduces material 
relating to Enron drawn from the company’s final published annual report, testimony at 
Congressional Hearings, and the Powers Report (Powers, 2002) with little commentary, the 
author using the 
o
in a final chapter (pp. 259-264).  The most curious “opportunist” is a spy thriller (Schwartz, 
2003) that mentions Enron in the title but otherwise has no connection with the company – 
evidence perhaps that the name “Enron” has entered public discourse as shorthand for major 
corporate fraud. 
 
In order to gather material from the books, we assigned each book to a “lead” reader, who 
read through their quota of books, highlighting and transcribing potentially relevant material.  
Some books contained detailed indexes: for example, Eichenwald (2005) gave 37 separate 
references to accounting and as many as 158 separate references to Arthur Andersen.  The 
references were all checked to determine whether the related text contained material relevant 
for this research.  After the initial reading, the “lead” reader sent a copy of the transcribed 
passages to the other researcher, who read the book quickly to ensure that no relevant 
passages had been omitted.  Some of the accounting-related passages were descriptions of 
Enron’s accounting policies, and the processes by which they were approved: for example, 
McLean & Elkind (2003, pp. 39-42) provide a technical explanation of mark-to-market 
accounting for Enron’s energy contracts, while Eichenwald (2005, p. 53-61) embeds the 
technical description within a more personalized discussion of Enron’s negotiations over 
                                                 
8 The movie, released in the USA in 2005 and in the UK in 2006, is produced by HDNet Films and Jigsaw 
Productions, directed by Alex Gibney and distributed by Magnolia Pictures. 
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olicies.9  The process of dual reading enhances the reliability of the data collection process, 
ant to our discussion will have been overlooked. 
aving been apparent for some time, Squires et al. 
003, p. xiv) stated in their Preface that readers “will understand the long chain of events 
the rest of this section, three themes 
he character of accountants; profession or industry; and honesty, integrity and trust) are 
ks that were examined.  
 
           
p
as it reduces the likelihood that material relev
 
The evidence – writing about accountants 
Given that Enron (and other collapses such as WorldCom and HIH) are often identified as 
accounting and/or auditing failures, we were surprised to observe a comparative lack of 
interest in accounting and auditing.  This may be because the authors were typically financial 
journalists, whose training does not necessarily involve a deep understanding of accounting 
and auditing issues.  In the studies of Enron, four main features usually attracted more than 
passing comment: the extensive use of mark-to-market accounting by Enron, and the 
problems that this entailed; the use of off-balance sheet vehicles; the relationship between 
Enron and its auditors Arthur Andersen; and Andersen’s notorious shredding of documents.  
The two insider accounts of Andersen (Squires, Smith, McDougal, & Yeack, 2003; Toffler, 
2003) focused more on the history of that firm and contrasted the character of the firm’s 
founder Arthur E. Andersen (and subsequent senior partners such as Leonard Spacek and 
Harvey Kapnick) with the atmosphere of the firm in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Claiming 
clues to the implosion of Andersen as h
(2
that eventually caused Andersen to fall”. 
 
However, passing comments can sometimes be more revealing of unconscious attitudes than 
explicit statements.  Authors frequently reveal their attitudes to accounting and accountants 
by the way they describe key individuals, the contrasts they set up between the past and the 
present, how they characterize the activity of accounting and auditing itself, and what they 
take for granted as the “proper duty” of an auditor.  Even single words that recur across 
different books can indicate widely held beliefs about what accounting and auditing, and the 
people practising these activities, are or ought to be.  In 
(t
explored by reference to the boo
 
The Character of Accountants 
Several writers refer to the stereotypes of accountants that have been documented in the 
scholarly literature.  DiPiazza & Eccles (2002, p. 153) note how, in the aftermath of the 
Enron and other scandals, “Derisive jokes about corruption and scandal have replaced 
harmless humor about bean counters.”  McLean & Elkind (2003, p. 143) state that auditors 
“are supposed to be stick-in-the-muds who say no far more often than they say yes.”  
Eichenwald (2005, p. 138) presents what he describes as “Hollywood’s idea of an accountant: 
[a] boring technocrat with green eyeshades.”  Positive stereotypes are also offered: for 
example, Jeter (2003, p. 168) quotes the description offered by a neighbour of Cynthia 
Cooper, an internal auditor at WorldCom: Cooper was “totally honest, with a character trait
this country needs more of, and that’s integrity.”  Galbraith (2004, p. 66) notes that 
“individuals of inquiring mind had long regarded accounting as both competent and honest.” 
However, authors tend to present the negative aspects of stereotypes as contrasts to how the 
accountant characters they describe actually behaved.  Eichenwald, for example, is at pains to 
emphasise that Stephen Goddard, the original Arthur Andersen engagement partner on the 
Enron audit, was not like the Hollywood stereotype: “He was a specialist in client services, a 
backslapper who maintained a close relationship with the managers whose numbers his team 
reviewed” (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 143).  In terms of stereotype theory, Eichenwald views 
Goddard as a member of a subtype (Kunda & Oleson, 1995).  Several authors contrast the 
characters of David Duncan, the Andersen engagement partner responsible for Enron who 
                                      
illiam & Jackson (2008) for a scholarly analysis of some of Enron’s accounting practices. 9 See Gw
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‘Pudgy, with wiry red hair and a pasty complexion, raised in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, 
ss accountant.  His 
 
Eichen
‘Unlike some colleagues, Bass didn’t see his job as helping clients weave through the 
 
The las
the mo
drawn 
Anders
r people who 
were brash and aggressive but knew less and less about actually investigating their 
5) 
e Great Depression.  Both these authors 
escribe the Insull business, which was a conglomerate in the US electricity supply network 
                                                
er prosecuted for obstruction of justice as a consequence of document shredding, and 
ss, a partner in Andersen’s Houston office and a member of the firm’s Professional 
ds Group.  Swartz describes Bass thus: 
Bass was also a stereotypical, by-the-book, resolutely cheerle
nickname, in fact, from the very first year at Andersen, was Partner Basshole, because 
his social skills were inversely proportional to his technical skills.  Colleagues wished 
he would spend more time on his golf game.’ (Swartz, 2003, p. 235) 
wald also emphasises Bass’s concentration on technical matters: 
accounting requirements, twisting transactions for the desired result.  His was a purer 
effect.  In his mind, accountants were referees; they weren’t supposed to join the team 
huddle with ideas on how to run the ball.  His approach made Bass something of an 
eccentric among his flashier colleagues.’ (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 140) 
t adjective in the previous quotation is significant: the writers often comment on how 
dern auditor is very different from the auditor of previous generations.  Differences are 
at both firm and individual level.  Swartz contrasts the original motto of Arthur E. 
en, “Think straight, talk straight”, with the firm’s behaviour in the 1990s: 
‘[O]n the audit side, the company was staffed with younger and younge
clients’ accounting practices.  The people who made partner, in turn, were great 
salespeople but not as technically proficient.  . . . [O]ld-fashioned accounting . . . was 
boring and didn’t bring in enough money anyway.  The new, unstated motto was 
‘Make it Work’.  Give the client what he wanted.’ (Swartz, 2003, p. 9
 
Toffler (2003, p. 7) notes how “the white-shoed accounting firm known for its legions of 
trained, loyal, honest professionals – a place that had the respect, envy, and admiration of 
everyone in Corporate America – had lost its way.”  In terms of stereotype theory, Arthur E. 
Andersen is being put forward as a prototype of the traditional accountant. 
 
Several writers exemplify Andersen’s status as a prototype of the traditional accountant by 
reference to an early episode when, faced with a corporate president who wanted the firm to 
agree to some egregious earnings management, Andersen replied: “There is not enough 
money in the city of Chicago to induce me to change the report” (Squires et al., 2003, p. 32, 
citing Arthur Andersen & Co., 1974; McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 144).10  The rise to 
prominence of the Andersen firm is linked by both Toffler (2003, p. 15) and Skeel (2005, p. 
103) to the work undertaken by the firm to reorganize the utility group set up in the 1920s by 
Samuel Insull, which collapsed spectacularly in th
d
industry, as the Enron of its day.  Arthur E. Andersen in particular is portrayed as a man 
whose firm “came to symbolize unyielding integrity” (Skeel, 2005, p. 103), as having “a 
reputation for straight talking” (Squires et al., 2003, p. 32), and as “a principled, even self-
righteous, man” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 143). 
 
On the other hand, David Duncan is presented as a prototype of the business professional 
stereotype.  Eichenwald (2005, p. 139) in particular seems to relish the contrast between Bass 
and Duncan.  He notes that “Duncan rarely impressed anyone as a towering intellect”, 
 
10 In an article in the Wall Street Journal, Brown & Dugan (2002) tell the same story, attributing it to the firm’s 
official history (Arthur Andersen & Co., 1988). 
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 generation within the firm.”  They note 
at “Arthur Andersen often attempted to match its personnel to its client counterparts in 
ven age.  It was also thought that Duncan’s youth and aggressiveness 
used as 
a point
consult
unhapp
from th rthur Andersen firm, as a catalyst for more aggressive behaviour by the firm.  
offler compares the firm to another occupation often stereotyped as dull and boring: 
ted from regarding the firm as a “public accountant”.  The change in 
ature of accounting firms has also been noted by Fusaro & Miller (2002, p. 146): 
This em
Brewst
                                                
describing him as “something of a party boy” at university, and suggesting that Duncan was a 
regular drug-taker in his early years with Andersen.  “Duncan was no accounting whiz, but 
nobody worried about that . . . [H]e struck some partners as top-flight where it mattered – his 
familiarity with Enron and a close relationship with its executives.  His good looks and 
disciplined organization didn’t hurt, either” (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 139).  A similar 
characterization of Duncan is offered by Swartz (2003, p. 234): “He was sharply handsome in 
a patrician sort of way, but his personality was soft.  He thrived in the cushy, cozy 
Republican suburbs of West Houston, happiest when playing golf.”  Skeel (2005, p. 180) also 
remarks on Duncan’s “regular golf outings and family get-togethers with his buddies at 
Enron.”  Squires et al. (2003, p. 125) see Duncan as someone whose “profile matched that of 
an Arthur Android, but he also represented the 1990s
th
personality, style, and e
would fit well in Enron’s ‘cowboy culture’ ” (Squires et al., 2003, pp. 125-126).  Duncan is 
widely described in the books under review as a “star” within Andersen because of his ability 
to generate such substantial fee income from Enron. 
 
Profession or Industry 
There is no consistent pattern among the books examined as to whether accounting and 
auditing as occupational activities are referred to as “profession” or “industry”.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly for a book co-authored by a Chief Executive Officer of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, DiPiazza & Eccles (2002) almost invariably talk of the “auditing 
profession” and the “accounting profession”.  Brewster (2003), however, uses the terms 
almost interchangeably (for example, on p. 19, “accounting profession” and “accounting 
industry” appear a mere 14 lines apart).11  Several authors note the way in which the big 
accounting firms (not just Andersen) expanded into consulting, with audit often being 
 of access for a firm’s consultants.  Toffler (2003),12 who had acted in a mainly 
ant-type role within Andersen, saw the growth of consulting in general, and the 
y relationship with, and ultimate divorce of, Andersen Consulting (now Accenture) 
e main A
T
‘Like the librarian who takes off her glasses, shakes her hair loose, and transforms 
herself into a vamp, this once-practical, plodding, and reliable icon of American 
professional service firms was about to give itself a radical makeover.’ (Toffler, 2003, 
p. 137). 
 
The use of the term “professional service firm” itself signifies how Andersen’s self-
perception had shif
n
“accounting firms have grown from stodgy partnerships to international consulting 
behemoths whose top partners make millions of dollars a year”.  Overall, the authors are 
aware that accounting firms of the 21st century are very different from their predecessors of a 
hundred years ago. 
 
erges in particular in the treatment of auditing and its relationship with consultancy.  
er, who had worked for several years as communications director at KPMG, may 
 
11 Squires et al. (2003, p. 173) manage to use the two formulations within consecutive sentences: “Changing the 
values of business and the accounting profession will require change that addresses the competition among 
accounting firms to get and keep audit clients at any cost.  To date, no one has come up with an ideal plan to 
reform the accounting industry.” 
12 This book has been the subject of an extensive review by Boyd (2004). 
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occasio
“from t
came to
 realized that through the audit relationship forged with a 
n.  The auditor saw the company’s finances 
The pro
stakeho
ing tool for the client.  This served two purposes: (1) to sell 
ervices firm.  In terms of stereotype 
eory, the schema associated with the traditional accountant stereotype casts accounting as a 
ers of [Andersen’s] life and work were everywhere.  An antique picture of a 
letter personally written by Arthur might hang in the lobby of a local office.  The Andersen 
quarters in Chicago were lined with visual reminders too.  (Squires et al., 
2003, p
The au
modern
case fo
he Arthur Andersen who sorted through the wreckage of Samuel Insull’s empire 
nally come across as an apologist for the big accounting firms, a risk of reporting 
he inside” (Carnegie & Napier, 1996, p. 24), but he is willing to note how auditors 
 undertake consultancy activities as a natural extension of the audit:  
‘Accounting firms soon
company, they might easily have an inside track to various projects throughout the 
client’s operations and administratio
across all lines of business, became well-acquainted with the management team, and 
had front-row seats to operational problems at warehouses or far-flung locations.’  
(Brewster, 2003, p. 10) 
blem was that auditors took this process too far, as the “client” shifted from external 
lders to the company’s management: 
‘Incredibly, the firms took a service on behalf of the shareholder and turned it into an 
information-gather
consulting services that would inevitably result from this new information, and (2) to 
rationalize higher fees.  As the audit report itself became a tool for the client rather 
than for the public, so, too, did the auditing team become an extension of the 
management team rather than a representative of the shareholders.’  (Brewster, 2003, 
p. 11) 
More radical critics, such as O’Brien (2003, p. 107) see the involvement of auditors in 
consultancy as fundamentally undermining the value of the audit: “The invigilators had 
become partners, eschewing credibility, if not in all cases honesty.”  In any case, while 
auditing is regarded by the authors as a “professional” activity, consultancy is not, even 
where the consulting is undertaken by a professional s
th
“professional” practice, while the schema associated with the business professional 
stereotype, not surprisingly, projects accounting as a business or industry.  Within accounting 
itself the increased involvement of auditors in consultancy was recognized as a “signal of 
movement” of accounting from profession to industry.  
 
The contrast between accounting as a profession and as an industry is brought out in the 
books by the ways in which the Arthur Andersen firm is portrayed.  According to McLean & 
Elkind, Arthur Andersen was “the most upright of the nation’s accounting firms” (McLean & 
Elkind, 2003, p. 143).  Squires et al. note how Andersen was a firm conscious of its history: 
Little remind
training center outside Chicago dedicated a section of the main building to an exhibit of his 
artefacts, including a pen, a ledger book, and an early time sheet.  The halls of Andersen’s 
worldwide head
. 37) 
 
thors seem to be using a “then and now” contrast to point up how far Andersen (and 
 auditors more generally) had changed over the 20th century.  This is particularly the 
r Skeel: 
‘T
prided himself on unflinching, uncompromising investigation of the companies he 
audited.  The Arthur Andersen auditors who held their noses and signed off on the 
Enron and WorldCom financial statements were another breed altogether.’  (Skeel, 
2005, p. 166). 
 
But at the same time, some authors use a different narrative trope: “old sins cast a long 
shadow”.  A crucial factor in the failure of auditors such as Andersen to resist the accounting 
manipulations of companies such as Enron and WorldCom was, as noted above, the reliance 
of Andersen on consulting income from audit clients.  This was no new feature, however.  
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ice, and a strategy for training that may have been mocked for 
elivering “Arthur Androids” but was aimed at developing a uniform workforce with shared 
he authors of these books believe that the significant growth in 
dersen are described as possessing 
almost 
implies
fundam
approb
Montgo icewaterhouseCoopers): 
. 74), for example, describes the 
fforts of Harvey Kapnick, Andersen’s Chief Executive Officer from 1970 to 1977, in 
                                                
One of the characteristics that the authors claim distinguished Andersen from other public 
accounting firms was that, from the beginning, the audit was seen not just as an attestation 
function, giving an opinion or certificate on a set of financial statements, but also as an 
opportunity to provide general business advice to the company (Brewster, 2003, p. 57).  Both 
Squires et al. (2003, p. 29) and Brewster (2003, p. 69) contrast the attitude of Arthur 
Andersen to consulting for audit clients with that of George O. May (senior partner and then 
chairman of Price Waterhouse between 1911 and 1940): while May believed in strict 
independence in appearance and in fact, and thought that auditors should do audits and not 
consulting, Andersen advocated “a new type of accounting, one that went beyond the 
numbers to really embrace the business problems of a client.  His concept of auditing 
resembled consulting as much as it did accounting” (Toffler, 2003, p. 14).  Although the 
Andersen insiders Squires et al. and Toffler argue that Andersen personally saw no conflict 
between audit and consulting so long as both activities were conducted with professional 
integrity, Squires et al. (2003, p. 38) describe consulting as a “Pandora’s Box” that Andersen 
left as his legacy to the firm.  Andersen believed that the “sides of the box” – his personal 
values that he had inculcated in partners and staff, the belief that Andersen was a unified firm 
that spoke with one vo
d
values – would hold secure.  T
consulting across the whole accounting profession, with Andersen in the vanguard, changed 
values so much that Pandora’s Box flew open, releasing negative values that ultimately 
pulled Andersen down. 
 
Honesty, Integrity and Trust 
If one word is representative of the authors’ attitude to accountants and auditors, recurring in 
many of the quotations provided in the previous sections, that word is “integrity”.  This is a 
characteristic that “founding fathers” such as Arthur An
innately – it is thus an element of the traditional accountant stereotype.  Integrity 
 an upright and honest personality, and in the accounting context it is associated with a 
ental desire to act, and to be seen as acting, independently.  Brewster quotes with 
ation from a speech made in 1937 by Robert Montgomery (of Lybrand, Ross & 
mery, a forerunner of Pr
‘Our profession always has had a vision – this urge to find and tell the truth – and we 
should cling to it and continue to strive for its accomplishment.  I do not want to see 
our growth depend on anything else than that which has made us what we are today.  
We shall retain our strength just as long as we retain our independence – no longer.’  
(Brewster, 2003, p. 62) 
Brewster claims that the successful accounting firms were those where the senior figures 
consciously saw themselves as owing a duty not just to the companies they audited but to the 
public welfare (Brewster, 2003, p. 63).  Even into the 1970s, integrity would be manifested 
through an attention to public responsibility.  Toffler (2003, p
e
“help[ing] Arthur Andersen cement its image as a firm of integrity by creating a Public 
Review Board staffed by outsiders to oversee the Firm.  . . .  ‘A public accounting firm has a 
significant responsibility to the private sector of our economy, not only to clients but also to 
investors, creditors and the public,’ he proclaimed in 1974.” 
 
However, the criticism of the accountants and auditors of the 1990s is that they are no longer 
persons of integrity.13  “In the end, it was all about the bucks.  . . .  The four cornerstones of 
 
13 If indeed they ever were: critics of the accounting profession, such as Mitchell, Puxty, Sikka, & Willmott 
(1994), have long suggested that professional claims to integrity are self-serving “smoke-screens”. 
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accounting operates in the U.S. – conflict between serving the public interest and 
                                                
success at Arthur Andersen – People Management, Quality, Thought Leadership, and 
Financial Performance – were referred to colloquially as ‘three pebbles and a boulder’.  The 
boulder was financial performance.  The rest, it seemed, was a joke” (Toffler, 2003, p. 105).  
However, it is not the perceived decline in independence engendered by the growth of 
consulting for audit clients that tips the balance in the minds of most of the authors of books 
under review.  The key episode that reveals the untrustworthiness of the previously trusted 
institutions of Andersen, in particular, and the auditing profession, in general, is the 
shredding of Enron-related documents in Andersen’s Houston office.14  The notoriety of the 
document shredding made it possible for Andersen as a firm to be indicted for obstruction of 
justice, and thus “ended [Andersen’s] last hope of survival” (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 667).  
Journalistic accounts describe how a convenient reminder from Andersen’s Chicago head 
office to Houston about the firm’s documentation retention policy stimulated the destruction 
of large quantities of notes and papers, alongside the wiping of computer records.  Although 
Squires et al. (2003, p. 16) suggest that few important doc 15
 document shredding was the crucial event in the death of Andersen.  They blame 
nterest for this: “The idea of a shredding machine churning paper into pulp had been 
e that the media could dramatize” (Squires et al., 2003, p. 16).  Swartz, reflecting the 
f Enron insider Sherron Watkins, backs up this view that the Enron/Andersen debacle 
 so significant because it made a good media story: 
‘[F]rom January through February 2002, the Enron story shifted from a reasonably 
contained accounting scandal to a full-blown, all-American morality play.  . . . [T]his 
story, though complicated on its face, could be reduced to a few simple elements that 
anyone could understand, i.e., greedy executives live large while duping loyal 
employees and unwitting shareholders.’  (Swartz, 2003, p. 346). 
More critical comments come from scholarly reflections.  Brewster in particular stresses the 
loss of trust, as is clear from the subtitle of his book, How the accounting profession forfeited 
a public trust.  He suggests that the loss of public trust has come in part from a growing 
public awareness that auditing is not about what “most members of Congress, the SEC, and 
the public believe it should be about” (Brewster, 2003, p. 295) – the detection of fraud.  He 
also points to a lack of publicly-visible leadership in the Big Four accounting firms, 
contrasting th
W
every important accounting debate of their time, each of them contributed positively to the 
public discourse in the United States” (Brewster, 2003, p. 289, emphasis added).  According 
to Hamilton & Micklethwait (2006, p. 181), “the auditing profession has never been held in 
less regard”. 
 
, though, is it fair to put so much blame on auditors?  O’Brien, for one, views the loss 
 as endemic to the financial system: “The integrity of the system itself has become 
ingly problematic because of the skewed relationships inculcated by a business culture 
eached a gospel of untrammelled market dominance” (O’Brien, 2003, p. 6).  In a 
 vein, according to Squires et al.: 
‘Arthur Andersen’s story is about the conflicting environment 
 
14 It is significant that the insider account by Cruver (2003), though virtually silent on accounting and auditing 
issues, plays off the shredding episode in the book’s subtitle The unshredded truth.  Bryce (2003, pp. 6-7, 
emphasis in original), writing that “The once-great accounting firm Arthur Andersen wasn’t just in bed with 
Enron, the venerable firm was providing the energy company with auditing and consulting services, while 
sharing office space – free shredding!”,  assumes that readers will understand the allusion without any need for 
explanation. 
15 The US Supreme Court ultimately overturned Andersen’s conviction for obstruction of justice in respect of 
Enron-related document shredding (Teather, 2005). 
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ence over the more traditional ideal 
f protecting the public interest through the audit process, and the Enron story provided a 
ditors gain legitimacy through their involvement in a “social 
vernment and the private sector” (Brewster, 2003, p. 13).  
ox is another author to reject the continued validity of the traditional accountant stereotype: 
, p. 181). 
Although the reputation of Carl e of the traditional accountant 
stereotype, seems to rank high in comparison with Duncan the Andersen star in the opinion of 
ost effective 
usiness professional is one who is able to support rather than oppose client management.  
maintaining profitability.  Although Andersen’s partners must carry some of the 
blame for the firm’s fall, they were also caught in a system where manipulating 
accounting guidelines and rules to please the client was often not only legal but 
rewarded by clients.’ (Squires et al., 2003, p. 165, emphasis added). 
 
The notion of “pleasing the client” seemed to take preced
o
vivid illustration of this.  If au
contract”, then questions about their integrity and a loss of trust in the audit process and in 
corporate financial statements can lead to a fracturing of the social contract, with wider 
ramifications for the professionalization of accounting.   
 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
We have shown how popular business writers make use of both the traditional accountant 
and business professional stereotypes to characterize particular accountants and to set out 
norms of behaviour against which individuals could be judged.  The general consensus of the 
books under review is that the traditional accountant stereotype is no longer descriptive of 
modern accountants, but that this may not be an altogether good thing.  Brewster, for 
example, quotes from an article in The New Yorker in which the claim is made that nothing is 
duller than accounting.  He describes this claim and other similar cases as “people who 
should have known better trott[ing] out tired old clichés about the profession” (Brewster, 
2003, p. 5).  Brewster points out that “auditing is a high-stakes, complicated art that cuts 
across the fault lines dividing go
F
Accounting firms were no longer the quiet conscience of business, stocked with professional 
introverts obsessed with numbers (one traditional industry joke said an extroverted 
accountant was one who stared at the client’s shoes while speaking instead of staring at his 
own shoes). (Fox, 2003
 
Bass of Andersen, a prototyp
several writers, this may simply reflect Duncan’s ill-fortune in being the public face of 
Andersen’s downfall. 
 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the relationship between accountant stereotypes and the 
primary purpose of accounting that the stereotypes imply.  The positive and negative 
characteristics of each stereotype are set out in the form of a “balance sheet”.  The traditional 
accountant stereotype is more strongly associated with the view that accounting is a 
profession, whose primary purpose is to serve the public interest.  Client interests are not seen 
as determinative, but will be served as a by-product of the pursuit of broader public interests 
(as indicated by the dotted arrow).  For the traditional accountant, the client is not “always 
right”, and it is quite appropriate for the traditional accountant to be cautious, prudent and 
risk-averse.  However, the business professional sees accounting as a commercial 
undertaking, and the main function of the business professional is to add value to clients 
through the provision of services, such as audit and assurance, tax advice and general 
consultancy, with a constant regard for spotting and exploiting further income generating 
opportunities.  If there is any conflict in the provision of services, it is that an auditor may 
have to give a negative opinion on management plans and actions, but the m
b
The business professional serves the public interest indirectly, perhaps by helping to enhance 
the efficiency of capital markets and creating employment opportunities for accounting 
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hile the sudden collapse of Enron led to questions about the 
le of its auditor (DiPiazza & Eccles, 2002, p. 153), revelations about the shredding of 
ntegrity, clients scuttled away even before the outcome 
f the obstruction of justice case was known.  The public had been awakened to an 
y means of the 
assage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (with the establishment of the PCAOB) and similar 
graduates, but more likely through providing advice that enhances social welfare indirectly 
through corporate profit maximization (as indicated by the dotted arrow). 
 
The schemas of both the traditional accountant and the business professional stereotypes 
have some positive and some negative characteristics.  The promotion of the business 
professional stereotype by professional accounting bodies and international accounting firms 
was part of an attempt to manage the trajectory of professionalization, maintaining the 
positive attributes of professional status (the view that accountants were well-educated, 
provided expertise and behaved ethically) while expanding this to encompass notions of 
entrepreneurship.  However, w
ro
documents by Arthur Andersen compounded public concerns, creating a perception that 
Andersen was in “cover-up” mode.   The untimely shredding of Enron documents was 
perceived to be the antithesis of the conduct of an independent auditor with a focus on 
protecting the public interest.   
 
Unfortunately for Arthur Andersen, the public trust in the firm had also been weakened by 
earlier “audit oversights”, including Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Sunbeam Corporation 
and Waste Management (Squires et al., 2003, pp. 118-122).  If Enron was a crisis of huge 
proportions, WorldCom added more fuel to the inferno.   Arthur Andersen had now moved to 
centre stage in the “all-American morality play” (Swartz, 2003, p. 346) that captured 
worldwide public attention.  The firm was not longer to be trusted and, despite its past 
achievements and past reputation for i
o
international accounting firm that had been aggressively enhancing its own interests at the 
expense of protecting the public interest.  In losing its licence to conduct audits in the USA as 
a result of the adverse obstruction of justice verdict handed down, Arthur Andersen had 
already lost the public’s confidence.   
 
Legitimacy theory claims that “the organization must appear to consider not only the rights of 
the investors, but also those of the public at large” (Deegan & Rankin, 1996, p. 54).  Society 
was not satisfied that Arthur Andersen had acted in an acceptable or legitimate matter, and 
effectively revoked the firm’s “contract” to continue its operations (Deegan & Rankin, 1996; 
Deegan, 2002, p. 293).  For Arthur Andersen, its breach of social contract was both shocking 
and fatal.  It was a breach of a global social contract, immediately and harshly impacting on 
its operations around the world.  In striving, above all else, “to please the client”, the firm had 
effectively displeased all of them, both the perceived clients – the firms being audited – and 
the implicit client – society as a whole.  While Arthur Andersen was judged to be operating 
profoundly outside its social contract, it was also widely apparent that the firm was not an 
“outrider” but was part of a system.  “The fall of Arthur Andersen is not a story about just 
one public accounting firm.  At its root, the Andersen story is about an entire system” 
(Squires et al. 2003, p. 171).  In summary, the system needed fixing.  B
p
reforms in other countries, such as The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (also known as CLERP 9) in Australia, 
governments began to exert more control over the accounting profession than hitherto, with 
intended positive implications for restoring trust in accounting and auditing. 
 
That the public trust in accounting and auditing in general even needed to be restored in this 
way clearly points to the manifestation of a “negative signal of movement” in the dynamic 
process of the professionalization of accounting.  Carnegie & Edwards (2001) argue that 
professionalization in accounting is a dynamic process involving a diversity of “signals of 
movement” towards occupational ascendancy that arise in periods before and after the 
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ignal among a range of diverse but unconnected events that 
perationalize the closure process (Carnegie & Edwards, 2001, pp. 303-304).  The signals of 
f professional accounting 
odies it is necessary to ensure that independence is embedded as a core characteristic of the 
pe.  Any continued emphasis on pleasing the client at the expense of 
unting and audit failures, the public trust in the profession established 
t an earlier time, largely on the basis of the dullness of accounting and related good-natured 
                                                
formation of occupational associations.  The formation of such associations, in itself, is 
perceived as one visible public s
o
movement explored by Carnegie & Edwards were generally associated with upward social 
mobility, whereas the notion of a “negative signal of movement” is related to events which 
impact adversely on the organized profession as it strives to maintain and even enhance the 
status of qualified practitioners. 
 
Accounting’s professional status, of course, had to be earned (see, for instance, Chandler & 
Edwards, 1994a, 1994b, 1996) and can never be assured (for example, West, 2003), 
especially when commentators within as well as outside professional practice choose to refer 
to the accounting “industry” rather than the accounting “profession”.  The sweeping post-
Enron global regulatory reforms are a stark reminder that the professionalization of 
accounting is a process rather than an outcome.  As a dynamic process, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the time specific status of accounting as an occupation rather than to take its 
status for granted.  Negative signals of movement, as influential events within the 
professionalization process of accounting, can be both global and debilitating.  Meanwhile, as 
Fox (2003, p. 313) points out, “capitalism is a complicated enterprise, and the system won’t 
work without referees”.  Preserving the independence of professional accountants, both in 
fact and in appearance, as the faithful “referees” remains accounting’s biggest challenge in 
maintaining its professional status, and from the perspective o
b
accountant stereoty
guarding the public interest16 is likely to lead to the advent of further negative signals of 
movement in the professionalization process of accounting, to such an extent that it may 
become appropriate to identify a process of deprofessionalization. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The book literature emerging in the aftermath of Enron makes use of accountant stereotypes 
to signal a movement in attitudes towards accountants.  The traditional accountant stereotype 
is mobilized almost in nostalgia for a time when accountants may have been boring but could 
be relied on to be upright, independent and respectable in the mould of Arthur E. Andersen 
and others.  On the other hand, the business professional, seeking to please the client, is 
shown to create serious concerns about the accounting profession’s integrity and competence.  
According to Brewster (2003, p. 283), “Enron prompted Congress to wonder if accountants 
were corrupt.  WorldCom prompted Congress to wonder if accountants were incompetent”.  
As a result of such acco
a
humour, “has today been squandered” (Brewster, 2003, p. 69).  This has led to positive steps 
to ensure accounting honesty (Galbraith, 2004, p. 66), although the impacts of regulatory 
reforms around the world are currently (late 2008) being stress-tested under extreme 
economic conditions.  
 
Paradoxically, though, the attempts of professional accounting bodies to overcome the 
traditional accountant stereotype in order to maintain or regain legitimacy (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Hinton, 2000) may play into the hands of those who consider that the accounting 
profession may be beyond reform.  The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, for 
example, concerned about the reduction in student interest in accounting as a career, has been 
campaigning through advertising to “counter the perception of accountants as boring.  ‘We 
 
16 A critic of the tendency of accounting firms to lobby on behalf of preparers rather than users of financial 
statements is Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Levitt, 2002).  
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eotype make entrepreneurship a “boulder” for modern 
accountants and their professional associations, leaving education, expertise and ethics as 
professional “pebbles”?  If so, then accountants may find that society at large will not be 
prepared to renegotiate social contracts on terms with which the large accounting firms will 
be comfortable.  This could lead to the deprofessionalization rather than the continued 
ounting.   
 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Minho, March 2006, the 
Eighth Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, Cardiff, July 2006, the 
Thirtieth Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, Lisbon, April 2007, the 
University of Siena, July 2007, the University of Bergamo, January 2008 and the University 
of South Australia, October 2008. 
are addressing the image of accountants with the message that to become a chartered 
accountant means you will be able to be successful in business,’ says ICAA General 
marketing manager Marie Campion” (Kazi, 2006, p. 69).  But will this mean that accountants 
will be trained to focus on the “boulder” of financial performance at the expense of the 
“pebbles” of people management, quality and thought leadership (Toffler, 2003, p. 105)?  
Does the business professional ster
professionalization of acc
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Books on Enron and Other Corporate Collapses Reviewed 
Author and 
year of 
publication 
Title Comments 
I. Insider accounts 
Brewer & 
Hansen (2004) 
Enron: Confessions of a whistle blower Main author was a trader with a 
background in accounting 
Cruver (2003) Anatomy of greed: The unshredded truth from 
an Enron insider 
Author was a trader with Enron and had 
no accounting involvement 
Squires et al. 
(2003) 
Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting  values, 
unexpected consequences 
Authors worked for Andersen, mainly 
on the consulting side 
Swartz (2003) Power failure: The rise & fall of Enron Collaboration with Sherron Watkins, an 
Enron internal auditor and whistle-
blower 
Toffler (2003) Final accounting: Ambition, greed and the fall 
of Arthur Andersen 
Author was partner in charge of Ethics 
and Responsible Business Consulting 
Group at Andersen 
II. Journalistic accounts 
Bryce (2003) Pipe dreams: Greed, ego, and the death of 
Enron 
Author is an investigative financial 
journalist based in Texas 
Eichenwald 
(2005) 
Conspiracy of fools: A true story Author is a financial journalist who 
followed Enron for the New York Times 
Fox (2003) Enron: The rise and fall Author is a business journalist who 
followed Enron for Dow Jones News 
Service 
Fusaro & Miller 
(2002) 
What went wrong at Enron Fusaro is an energy analyst who 
followed Enron for several years 
Jeter (2003) Disconnected: Deceit and betrayal at 
WorldCom 
Deals with collapse of WorldCom 
Main (2005) Other people’s money: The complete story of 
the extraordinary collapse of HIH 
Deals with Australian HIH insurance 
collapse 
McLean & 
Elkind (2003) 
The Smartest guys in the room: The amazing 
rise and scandalous fall of Enron 
Authors are senior writers for Fortune 
magazine 
Westfield 
(2003) 
HIH: The inside story of Australia’s biggest 
corporate collapse 
Deals with Australian HIH insurance 
collapse 
III. Scholarly reflections 
Bakan (2004) The corporation: The pathological pursuit of Basis of an award-winning TV 
- 28 - 
Author and 
year of 
publication 
Title Comments 
profit and power documentary 
Brewster (2003) Unaccountable: How the accounting 
profession forfeited public Ttust 
Brewster spent seven years as 
Communications Director of KPMG 
DiPiazza & 
Eccles (2002) 
Building public trust: The future of corporate 
reporting 
DiPiazza was CEO of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Galbraith 
(2004) 
The economics of innocent fraud: Truth for 
our time 
Short book by eminent economist, 
author of The Great Crash, 1929 
Hamilton & 
Micklethwait 
(2006) 
Greed and corporate failure: The lessons 
from recent disasters 
Covers Barings, Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco, Marconi, Swissair, Royal Ahold, 
Parmalat cases – graced with a preface 
by Sir David Tweedie 
O’Brien (2003) Wall Street on trial: A corrupted state? Author is a former financial journalist 
and now a researcher into corporate 
governance 
Rapoport & 
Dharan (2004) 
Enron: Corporate fiascos and legal 
implications 
Collection of articles and readings 
Skeel (2005) Icarus in the boardroom: The fundamental 
flaws in corporate America and where they 
came from 
Author is a professor of corporate law 
IV. “Opportunists” 
Barreveld 
(2002) 
The Enron collapse: Creative accounting, 
wrong economics or criminal acts? 
Reproduces published material – 
largely about author’s economic ideas 
Elliott & 
Schrott (2002) 
How companies lie: Why Enron is just the tip 
of the iceberg 
General discussion of creative 
accounting with some references to 
Enron 
Prashad (2002) Fat cats and running dogs: The Enron stage 
of capitalism 
Critique of privatization in Third World 
Ritchie (2005) God in the pits: The Enron-jihad edition Discusses perceived lack of spiritual 
engagement in US derivatives markets 
– Enron reference relates to current 
edition (book first appeared in 1989) 
and Enron is mentioned briefly in new 
introduction. 
Schilit (2002) Financial shenanigans: How to detect 
accounting gimmicks and fraud in financial 
reports 
General discussion of creative 
accounting first published in 1991 – 
brief chapter at end on Enron 
Schwartz (2003) Enron to the 5th power Self-published spy thriller – nothing to 
do with Enron except use of company 
name in the title 
 
- 29 - 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Books on Enron and other scandals: a typology 
 
IV 
I:  Insider accounts 
II: Journalist accounts 
III: Scholarly reflections 
IV: “Opportunists” 
IV 
IV 
IIIIII
- 30 - 
 
 
Figure 2: Accountant stereotypes and their implications 
Traditional 
accountant
stereotype
Business 
professional
stereotype
Trusted, 
honest, 
integrity
Dull, 
uncreative, 
uncommercial
Traditional 
‘balance sheet’
Business-
focused, 
exciting, 
creative
Pleases client 
too easily, 
opportunistic
Modern 
‘balance sheet’
Accounting 
profession
Accounting 
industry
Serving 
public 
interest
Adding 
value to 
client
Primary 
purpose
Primary 
purpose
Secondary 
purposes
 
 
 
